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INTRODUCTION
This paper argues that Operation Allied Force—the United States led, 
NATO military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 
the Kosovo War aimed at ensuring full compliance with UN Security 
Council Resolution 1199—violated both United States and international 
law. Part I of this paper provides a brief history of Kosovo in order to place 
the conflict in the proper context. It continues with a blow-by-blow account 
 † J.D. with International Law Certificate, The Florida State University College of 
Law; M.B.A., International Business and Management, The University of Toledo; B.S., 
Eastern Michigan University. The idea for this paper arose when reading a question posed in 
the notes of CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW CASES 
AND MATERIALS 255 n.17 (2006). 
 ‡ J.D. with International Law Certificate, The Florida State University College of 
Law; B.A., History, George Mason University. 
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of the events and decisions leading up to the initiation of Operation Allied 
Force and ends with a detailed description of the operation, which was the 
second major combat operation in NATO’s history, following the 
September 1995 Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Part II explores how the war powers are allocated between the Executive 
and Legislative branches of the United States federal government under the 
Constitution. In addition, the President and Congress’s authority over the 
United States Armed Forces under the War Powers Resolution is explained.  
Part III argues not only that President Clinton lacked the constitutional 
authority to commit United States Armed Forces to NATO’s Operation 
Allied Force, but also that continuing the operation until June 10, 1999 
violated the War Powers Resolution.  
Part IV explores whether Operation Allied Force was illegal under 
international law. Through an examination of key events, originating with 
Operation Allied Force and leading up to Kosovo’s 2008 unilateral 
declaration of independence and the July 22, 2010 International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) Advisory Opinion, the authors analyze whether Operation 
Allied Force violated the U.N. Charter’s prohibition against the use of force 
and conclude that the Operation cannot be legally justified under the 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention.  
I.  THE CONFLICT IN KOSOVO
A.  A Brief History of Kosovo 
The Kosovo conflict is complicated. One must know its deep historical 
background in order to properly understand it. Kosovo lies in southern 
Serbia. Albanian and Slavic peoples have coexisted in Kosovo since the 
eighth century.1 With the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbia by 
Stephen Nemanya in 1168 A.D., Serb national identity started to grow.2 By 
that time, Kosovo had become the administrative and cultural center of the 
medieval Serbian State.3 Kosovo remained part of the Serbian Empire until 
it became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1389 after the famous Battle of 
Kosovo Polje in which the Serbs and their allies were defeated by the 
Ottoman Turks.4 To this day, Serbs consider the Battle the primary reason 
 1. MICHAEL BYERS, WAR LAW 100 (2005). 
 2. MOHAMMAD TAGHI KAROUBI, JUST OR UNJUST WAR? INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
UNILATERAL USE OF ARMED FORCE BY STATES AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH CENTURY 171 
(2004). 
 3. Id.
 4. Id. at 172. 
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for the collapse of the medieval Serbian State,5 and they hold the 
battleground sacred as a critical piece of their national pride.6
After they were defeated by the Ottoman Turks, Serbs abandoned the 
region while Albanians started to move back into Kosovo in large numbers.7
During the 17th and 18th centuries, the population of Kosovo gradually 
became dominated by ethnic Albanians.8
In the second half of the 19th century, Serbs began seeking to regain their 
lost lands.9 In response to this, the Ottoman Turks encouraged more 
Albanians to settle in Kosovo.10 After the Ottoman Turks were defeated in 
the Russo-Ottoman War in 1878, Serbs regained control of Pristina—the 
modern day capitol of Kosovo.11 When the Serbs won the first Balkan War 
in 1912, the entire region of Kosovo came under Serbian authority, and 
Serbs started to migrate back.12
Following World War I, Serbs implemented a policy that attempted to 
shift the demographics of Kosovo.13 Serbs encouraged settlers from other 
regions to move to Kosovo while forcing the Albanians to leave by illegally 
taking their land.14 Furthermore, the Yugoslav government gave Serbs and 
Montenegrins preferential treatment.15 Despite the unfavorable conditions in 
Kosovo, the population remained 63% Albanian.16
During World War II, Italy controlled most of Kosovo.17 In an attempt to 
recruit Albanian soldiers, the Yugoslav Partisan, Josip Broz Tito, promised 
Kosovo Albanians the right to unite with Albania after the war.18 In 1945, 
Tito’s promise was revealed as a lie.19 Albanians rose up in protest against 
Tito’s deception.20 In order to quiet the uprising, Tito declared Kosovo an 
autonomous province of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of 
 5. Id.; Gerald G. Howard, Comment, Combat in Kosovo: Ignoring the War Powers 
Resolution, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 261, 264 (2001). 
 6. Howard, supra note 5, at 264; see also MIRANDA VICKERS, BETWEEN SERB AND
ALBANIAN: A HISTORY OF KOSOVO 12-16 (1998).  





 12. Id. at 175. 
 13. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 175. 
 14. Id. at 176. 
 15. Id.
16. Id.; see also G. Richard Jansen, Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo: An Abbreviated 
History, COLO. ST. UNIV., http://lamar.colostate.edu/~grjan/kosovohistory.html (last updated 
July 22, 2008). 
 17. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 176. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.
 20. Id.
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Yugoslavia.21 In reality, however, the policy-making capabilities of the 
province remained very limited.22 Ethnic Albanians suffered acts of 
violence, terror, and harassment at the hands of the Yugoslav Secret 
Police.23 As the Yugoslav government implemented a policy to change the 
cultural demographics of Kosovo,24 many Albanians left the region; that 
trend continued until 1967.25  
In 1974, Yugoslavia adopted a new constitution.26 The most important 
point in the Yugoslav Constitution was the equal constitutional element.27 
According to the Constitution, Kosovo was an equal constitutional element 
of the Yugoslav Federation as one of eight federal units.28 Although not a 
republic, Kosovo’s authority within the Federation was now equal to that of 
Serbia.29  
Following the change in Kosovo’s status there was a high Albanian birth 
rate within the province while Serbs migrated out due to lack of economic 
opportunities.30 As a result, the Serbs became a clear minority within 
Kosovo.31 Today, the majority of Kosovars are ethnic Albanians.32  
During the 1970s and 1980s, Kosovo enjoyed a high degree of autonomy 
within Yugoslavia.33 In 1989, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic altered 
the status of Kosovo by removing its autonomy and bringing it under the 
direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital.34 The Kosovar Albanians 
strenuously opposed Milosevic’s decision to eliminate the autonomy of 
Kosovo.35 In 1990, amid a growing movement among Kosovars for 
complete autonomy, the Milosevic regime began a routine of strict control 
over the region.36 
  
 21. Id. The autonomy of Kosovo has been accepted since 1946 even though the 1946 
Yugoslav constitution in did not grant territorial autonomy to Kosovo. Id. See CONSTITUTION 
OF THE FEDERAL PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 1946. Kosovo was defined as an 
autonomous region under federal, not Serbian, jurisdiction. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 176 
n.162. 
 22. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 176. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 176-77. 
 25. Id. at 177. 
 26. Id.; see also USTAV SOCIJALISTI KE FEDERATIVNE REPUBLIKE JUGOSLAVIJE 
[CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA] 1974. 
 27. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 177. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. NATO & Kosovo: Historical Overview, NATO, 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last updated July 15, 1999) [hereinafter NATO & 
Kosovo]. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Howard, supra note 5, at 264-65; VICKERS supra note 6, at 244-54. 
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At first, the ethnic Albanian majority resisted non-violently.37 “By the 
mid-1990’s ethnic Albanian resistance came in the form of violent 
retaliatory attacks conducted by several underground groups against ethnic 
Serbs living in Kosovo.”38 In 1998, open conflict erupted39 as “ethnic 
Albanian guerillas calling themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
began attacks on Serbian police and Yugoslav army troops.”40 The conflict 
resulted in the deaths of over 1500 Kosovar Albanians and forced 400,000
people from their homes.41
B.  Key Events and Decisions Leading Up to the Initiation of Operation 
Allied Force 
“The international community became gravely concerned about the 
escalating conflict, its humanitarian consequences, and the risk of it 
spreading to other countries.”42 The United States, in partnership with 
NATO member countries and other allies, sought a diplomatic resolution to 
the conflict and began to pressure Milosevic to cease repression and restore 
autonomy to Kosovo.43
On May 28, 1998, the North Atlantic Council . . . set out NATO’s two 
major objectives with respect to the crisis in Kosovo[: (1)] to help to 
achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the response 
of the international community; [and (2)] to promote stability and security 
in neighboring countries with particular emphasis on Albania and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.44
In June, NATO began to consider a large number of military options.45
On June 9, 1998, President Clinton issued an Executive Order that 
declared a “national emergency” to deal with the threat of regional 
destabilization posed by the conflict in Kosovo.46 President Clinton ordered 
economic sanctions against Republic of Yugoslavia leaders after finding 
that “the actions and policies of the government of the Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Serbia with 
respect to Kosovo . . . constitute[d] an unusual and extraordinary threat to 
 37. STEVEN WOEHREL & JULIE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31053, KOSOVO AND 
U.S. POLICY 2 (2006). 
 38. Howard, supra note 5, at 265; VICKERS supra note 6, at 290-91. 
 39. NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 40. WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37. 
 41. Ved P. Nanda, NATO’s Armed Intervention in Kosovo and International Law, 10 
U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2000); see also NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 42. See NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 43. WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37, at 3. 
 44. See NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 45. Id.
 46. Exec. Order No. 13,088, 63 Fed. Reg. 32,109 (June 9, 1998). 
298 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:2
the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”47 The 
Executive Order blocked the governments of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the 
Republic of Montenegro property and property interests that were either 
within the United States or in the “possession or control of United States 
persons.”48
On September 23, 1998, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
UN Security Council Resolution 1199.49 The Resolution expressed deep 
concern about the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces and the 
Yugoslav army and called for a cease-fire.50
“On October 13, 1998 . . . the NATO Council authorised Activation 
Orders for air-strikes.”51 “This move was designed to support diplomatic 
efforts to make the Milosevic regime withdraw forces from Kosovo, 
cooperate in bringing an end to the violence, and facilitate the return of 
refugees to their homes.”52 “At the last moment . . . President Milosevic 
agreed to comply and the air-strikes were called off.”53
In January 1999, the situation in Kosovo flared up again when forty-five 
ethnic Albanian civilians were massacred.54 Diplomatic efforts intensified. 
The Contact Group—comprised of the United States, Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy and Russia—agreed on a draft peace plan for Kosovo.55 In 
February 1999, the Contact Group invited an ethnic Albanian delegation 
and representatives of the Serbian government to participate in peace 
negotiations in Rambouillet, France.56 As an incentive for the Serbian 
government to comply, the North Atlantic Council had already agreed to 
authorize NATO air-strikes against targets in Serbia if it rejected the peace 
plan.57
“As the rhetoric of possible United States use of force against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia began to reach a crescendo, Congressman Tom 
Campbell and thirty-eight other members of Congress sent a letter to 
President Clinton.”58 The letter opened by reminding President Clinton “that 
the Constitution requires [him] to obtain authority from Congress before 
 47. Id.
 48. Id.
 49. S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199, at 1 (Sept. 23, 1998), 
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/scres98.htm.
 50. Id.
 51. NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 52. Id.
 53. Id.
 54. Id.; Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D.C.C. 1999).  
 55. WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37, at 3. 
 56. Id. at 3-4. 
 57. Id. at 4. 
 58. Geoffrey S. Corn, Clinton, Kosovo, and the Final Destruction of the War Powers 
Resolution, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1149 (2001). 
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taking military action against Yugoslavia.”59 The letter emphasized that the 
military action in Kosovo “falls within the exclusive powers and 
responsibilities of Congress under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution—
the war powers clause.”60
It went on to say:  
No provision of the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty 
can override the requirement of United States domestic law as set forth in 
the Constitution. In fact, Congress conditioned U.S. participation in both 
the U.N. and NATO on the requirement that Congress retain its 
constitutional prerogatives. The Constitution compels you to obtain 
authority from Congress before taking military action against 
Yugoslavia.61
The letter closed sternly by flatly stating, “past violations of 
constitutional duty form no justification for additional violations. Nor does 
consulting with a few Members of Congress satisfy the constitutional 
obligation to obtain the approval of Congress.”62
On March 18, 1999, the ethnic Albanian delegation signed the peace 
plan; the Serbian representatives rejected it.63 “Although the numbers of 
Kosovo-Albanians killed, raped or expelled up to this point were low, the 
credibility of NATO’s threats was at issue.”64 Immediately after rejecting 
the peace plan, “Serbian military and police forces stepped up the intensity 
of their operations against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.”65
On March 23, 1999, NATO issued an order to commence air-strikes 
under the name Operation Allied Force.66 On March 24, 1999, the United 
States Armed Forces in coalition with NATO allies began air-strikes on 
Serbian forces in Kosovo and government targets in Serbia and 
Montenegro.67
C.  Operation Allied Force 
Operation Allied Force was the largest military operation in Europe since 
World War II.68 Over the 78-day air campaign, thirteen NATO countries 
 59. Id. at 1150 (quoting Letter from Representative Tom Campbell and other 




 63. WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37, at 3. 
 64. BYERS, supra note 1, at 101. 
 65. NATO & Kosovo, supra note 32. 
 66. Id.
 67. BYERS, supra note 1, at 101; WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37, at 3. 
 68. Nanda, supra note 41, at 9.  
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deployed over 1,000 aircraft and flew 38,400 sorties.69 Of those, 10,484 
were strike sorties that released 26,614 air munitions over the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.70 A 15,000 feet minimum altitude was adopted in 
order for attacking aircraft to avoid enemy air defenses.71 NATO usually 
conducted the air campaign from a safe altitude of 20,000 feet.72
The purpose of Operation Allied Force “was to disrupt and degrade 
Serbian forces”73 and to prevent a humanitarian crisis.74 This was to be 
accomplished by using precision bombing—”smart bombs”—in order to 
prevent hurting innocent civilians.75 However, civilian casualties occurred 
because of human error and other forces beyond NATO’s control.76 For 
example, “because of bad weather, a NATO pilot [who was] engaged in 
mounting a remotely directed attack on a bridge struck a passing train, 
killing many passengers.”77 Also, NATO accidentally hit the Chinese 
Embassy with precision-guided bombs;78 they had mistaken the embassy for 
a legitimate military target.79 As the Operation progressed and the air-strikes 
intensified, the means of attack were broadened to include cluster bombs 
and depleted uranium ordnance, both of which caused civilian casualties.80
The number of civilian casualties caused by Operation Allied Force is 
open to debate. One estimate approximates five hundred civilian deaths—
which, if true, would represent the largest number of deaths inflicted on 
another state in a military operation overseen by President Clinton.81 By 
 69. INDEP. COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 92 (2000). 
 70. Id. 
 71. JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND USE OF FORCE BY STATES 
120 (2004). 
 72. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 73. Id. at 9. 
 74. KAROUBI, supra note 2, at 188. 
 75. Nanda, supra note 41, at 9; Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the 
Future of International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 847, 851 (1999). 
 76. Nanda, supra note 41, at 9. 
77. Id.
 78. Chinese Anger at Embassy Bombing (BBC News broadcast May 9, 1999), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/9/newsid_2519000/251927 
1.stm. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Falk, supra note 75, at 851-52. 
 81. Elizabeth Becker, Rights Group Says NATO Killed 500 Civilians in Kosovo 
War, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2000 at A10. See also RYAN C. HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON
WARS: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND WAR POWERS 117 (2002). “Human Rights Watch 
concludes that as few as 489 and as many as 528 Yugoslav civilians were killed in the ninety 
separate incidents in Operation Allied Force.” Refugees were among the victims. Almost two 
thirds (303 to 352) of the total registered civilian deaths occurred in twelve incidents where 
ten or more civilian deaths were confirmed. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE CRISIS IN KOSOVO 
(2000), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/Natbm200-01.htm.  
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Serbian estimates, two thousand civilians were killed.82 In comparison to the 
number of civilian casualties, NATO forces incurred none.83
Operation Allied Force ended on June 10, 1999, seventy-nine days after 
it began.84 “NATO and Yugoslav military officers concluded a Military 
Technical Agreement governing the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from 
Kosovo.”85 By the time the operation had ended, it had 912 aircraft and 35 
ships at its disposal—almost triple the forces it started with.86 And NATO 
forces had destroyed “Serbian planes, helicopters, anti-aircraft guns, 
missiles, and infrastructure including bridges, [and] communication 
towers.”87
II.  AUTHORITY TO MAKE WAR
A. The Constitutional War Powers of the Executive and Legislative 
Branches 
The United States Constitution divides authority over military forces and 
their employment between the Legislative and Executive branches of the 
federal government. However, it does not clearly vest the power to initiate 
hostilities in either branch.88
Arguably, the Constitution provides Congress with many more duties 
and responsibilities pertaining to war than it does the President.89 Under 
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, Congress is allocated 
the power to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the 
United States,”90 “declare War,”91 “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”92
“make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,”93 “raise and support 
Armies”94 and a navy,95 make rules regulating the armed forces,96 “provide 
 82. Kevin Cullen, Amid the Rubble and Death, Few Find Elation in Milosevic’s 
“Victory,” BOS. GLOBE, June 11, 1999, at A22; see also HENDRICKSON, supra note 81, at 
117. 
 83. GARDAM, supra note 71, at 117. 
 84. WOEHREL & KIM, supra note 37, at 3-4. 
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Adam Roberts, NATO’s “Humanitarian War” Over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 
109 (1999). 
 87. Nanda, supra note 41, at 9. 
 88. John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1673, 1676 (2000). 
 89. Andrew D. LeMar, Note, War Powers: What Are They Good For? 
Congressional Disapproval of the President’s Military Actions and the Merits of a 
Congressional Suit Against the President, 78 IND. L.J. 1045, 1046 (2003). 
 90. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 91. Id. at cl. 11. 
 92. Id.
 93. Id.
 94. Id. at cl. 12. 
 95. Id. at cl. 13. 
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for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress 
Insurrections and repel Invasions,”97 provide for “organizing, arming, and 
disciplining, the Militia,”98 and govern the parts of the militia that “may be 
employed in the Service of the United States.”99 Additionally, Congress has 
the authority to make laws necessary to exercise its powers.100
In order for there to be a constitutionally valid declaration of war, a 
measure calling for such declaration must be passed by both Houses of 
Congress and then presented to the President for signature.101 Separate and 
substantially different actions by the Senate and House, short of enactment, 
cannot have legal effect.102
The President’s war powers are stated much more concisely. Under 
Article II of the Constitution, “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”103 The 
President may also have military powers as a result of other provisions of 
Article II, such as the “vesting clause” or the Take Care Clause.104
 96. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14. 
 97. Id. at cl. 15. 
 98. Id. at cl. 16.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 18. 
 101. Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late 1990s by Partial Congressional 
Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 4 (1999); Michael Hahn, The Conflict in Kosovo: A 
Constitutional War?, 89 GEO. L.J. 2351, 2367 (2001). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”); id. § 7 (“Every Bill which shall 
have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be 
presented to the President of the United States.”); id. § 8 (“The Congress shall have the 
power To . . . declare War. . . . “). Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding the 
legislative veto unconstitutional). 
 102. Tiefer, supra note 101, at 2; Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. Even though the language of 
Chadha only deals with attempts by the Senate and House to take part in statutorily 
delegated powers—rather than shared constitutional powers—it is informed by the Formalist 
approach and teaches that almost all legislation must go through the full enactment process 
of bicameralism and presentment. Tiefer, supra note 101, at 16; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 
n.16, 954-55. The Formalist approach holds that Congress must follow the normal legislative 
process when affirmatively approving a military action. Hahn, supra note 101, at 2367. The 
alternative approach is the Functionalist approach. Under the Functionalist approach, both 
Houses of Congress must affirmatively demonstrate approval for the commencement of war 
prior to the President’s orders to launch the first attack. Id. at 2370. Congress’s approval for 
military action may be inferred from its treatment of resolutions, bills, and appropriations—
even those that do not pass through bicameralism and presentment. Id. at 2367. Applying the 
Functionalist approach to the Kosovo conflict produces the conclusion that the conflict in 
Kosovo was unconstitutional because not only did both Houses of Congress not approve the 
military action in Kosovo before it began but both Houses never agreed on approval after the 
conflict ended. See Hahn, supra note 101. 
 103. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.  
 104. CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW CASES 
AND MATERIALS 220 (2d ed. 2006). 
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The President has no power to initiate or declare war105 either against a 
foreign nation or a domestic State.106 As Commander in Chief, the President 
has the legal authority to direct military forces and deploy them in any 
appropriate manner after a declaration of war is made by Congress.107 In 
essence, “the President carries into effect all laws passed by Congress to 
conduct war once it is declared, to regulate the armed forces, and to define 
and punish all offenses against the rights that exist between nations.”108
Yet “the President does have the power to recognize the existence of a 
state of war109 forced upon the United States, and to determine whether war 
has been initiated by invasion of a foreign entity into the United States.”110
In those particular cases, “the President is permitted to resist by force and 
respond to the challenge without waiting for special legislative 
authorization.”111
B.  Executive and Legislative War Powers Under the War Powers 
Resolution 
After years of unsuccessful military operations in Vietnam, and President 
Nixon’s continued disregard of congressional pleas to obey the war powers 
structure set forth in the Constitution, Congress passed the War Powers 
Resolution112 over President Nixon’s veto in 1973.113
Congress specifically relied on its powers enumerated under Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution when it enacted the War Powers Resolution.114
By enacting the War Powers Resolution, Congress attempted to restore the 
constitutional balance of war powers so as to “fulfill the intent of the 
 105. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Congress has the power “To declare War, grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.” 
Id.
 106. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
 107. Kelly L. Cowan, Comment, Rethinking the War Powers Resolution: A 
Strengthened Check on Unfettered Presidential Decision Making Abroad, 45 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 99, 102 (2004). See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614-15 (1850). 
 108. Id. at 101; see Fleming, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 614-15.  
 109. Id.; Matthews v. McStea, 91 U.S. 7, 12-13 (1875). 
 110. Cowan, supra note 107 at 102; The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 698-99. 
 111. Cowan, supra note 107, at 102 (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 698-99); The 
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668. 
 112. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000)). It is important to note that since 1973 every President has 
taken the view that the War Powers Resolution “is an unconstitutional infringement by 
Congress on the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.” RICHARD F. GRIMMETT,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 81050, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE 2
(2004). “The courts have not directly addressed this question.” Id.
 113. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT VETOING H.J. RES. 542, A JOINT RESOLUTION 
CONCERNING THE WAR POWERS OF CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT, H. DOC. NO. 93, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). 
 114. War Powers Resolution § 1541(b). 
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framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the 
collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the 
introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”115
The War Powers Resolution is laid out in nine sections.116 On its face the 
War Powers Resolution “envisions congressional approval and close 
monitoring of military involvement in all but time sensitive situations.”117
Its “core purpose is to prevent the President from ordering the initiation of 
combat operations absent the express consent of Congress.”118
Under § 1541(c) of the War Powers Resolution, Congress expressly 
limited the President’s Executive power as Commander in Chief of the 
United States Armed Forces. The sections states:  
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to 
introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) 
specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by 
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed 
forces.119
In subsequent sections the statute prescribes specific duties and 
procedures to be followed by the President and Congress in exercising their 
constitutional powers to commit American forces into hostilities. 
Section 1542 requires the President “in every possible instance [to] 
consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances.”120 This consultation requirement is 
obligatory.121 The President is “obliged by law to consult [with Congress] 
before the introduction of forces into hostilities and to continue 
consultations so long as the troops are engaged.”122 After the Resolution was 
passed, the House committee explained that the word “hostilities” includes 
combat and any dispute where there is a “clear and present danger of armed 
conflict.”123
 115. Id. § 1541(a). 
 116. Id. §§ 1541-1548. 
 117. Howard, supra note 5, at 275. 
 118. Corn, supra note 58, at 1173. 
 119. War Powers Resolution § 1541(c) (entitled “Presidential executive power as 
Commander-in-Chief; limitation”). 
 120. Id. § 1542. The White House has attempted to construe the “hostilities” 
requirement very narrowly to avoid congressional control. Martin Wald, Note, The Future of 
the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1407, 1417 (1984).  
 121. The section uses the phrase “shall consult.” War Powers Resolution § 1542. 
 122. 119 CONG. REC. 33,550 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits). 
 123. Wald, supra note 120, at 1418; H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 1, 5 (1973), reprinted in 
1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346. 
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Under § 1543, when there is no congressional declaration of war, the 
President is required to submit a report124 “within forty-eight hours to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President Pro Tempore 
of the Senate” after introducing United States Armed Forces equipped for 
combat “into the territory, airspace, or waters of . . . foreign nation[s].”125
“[S]o long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such 
hostilities . . .,” the President must make periodic reports to Congress on the 
status of the hostilities.126 The periodic reports must be made at least once 
every six months.127
Pursuant to § 1544, once the President’s report is submitted to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President Pro Tempore 
of the Senate, the President must end any use of the United States Armed 
Forces within sixty calendar days unless “Congress [has] (1) declared war 
or has enacted specific authorization for such use of United States Armed 
Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically 
unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.”128 The 
President may extend the sixty-day deadline by an additional thirty days if 
he “determines and certifies to . . . Congress in writing that unavoidable 
military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces 
requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing 
about a prompt removal of such forces.”129
The next three sections of the War Powers Resolution detail procedures 
for consideration of resolutions and bills to declare war,130 provide 
authorization for a deployment,131 and allow for the recall of troops.132
Section 1547, the penultimate section of the War Powers Resolution,
addresses the inference to be drawn from previously signed laws and 
treaties.133 The section provides:  
 124. The reporting requirements are specifically detailed in § 1543 of the War Powers 
Resolution.  
 125. War Powers Resolution § 1543(a). 
 126. Id. § 1543(c). 
 127. Id.
 128. Id. § 1544(b). The section essentially functions as a burden-shifting device. As 
Judge Joyce Hens Green has observed:  
[T]he automatic cutoff after 60 days was intended to place the burden on the President to 
seek positive approval from the Congress, rather than to require the Congress positively to 
disapprove the action, which had proven so politically difficult during the Vietnam war. To 
give force to congressional power to declare war, Presidential warmaking would not be 
justified by congressional silence, but only by a congressional initiative . . . .  
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 
1983).  
129. Id. § 1544(b). 
130. Id. § 1545. 
 131. War Powers Resolution § 1546a. 
132. Id. §§ 1545-46. 
133. Id. § 1547(a) (emphasis added). 
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Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into 
situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
circumstances shall not be inferred-- 
(1) from any provision of law . . . including any provision contained in any 
appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the 
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such 
situations and states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory 
authorization within the meaning of this chapter; or  
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is 
implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of 
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and 
stating that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization 
within the meaning of this chapter. 
In other words, the authority to introduce United States Armed Forces 
into hostilities shall not be inferred from any provision of law or from any 
treaty,134 whether or not those laws or treaties were in effect prior to the 
passage of the War Powers Resolution.135 For congressional approval to be 
established for the introduction of United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities, Congress must explicitly state in law “that [the provision] is 
 134. Id. § 1547(a)(1-2).  
 135. Id. Section 1547 may negate any authority the President might potentially 
assume under the North Atlantic Treaty. See Howard, supra note 5, at 277. The 
constitutionality of § 1547(a)(1-2) has been questioned. Howard, supra note 5, at 277 n.93. 
Some argue that the provision is constitutional because ratification of treaties only requires 
Senate action—”advice and consent”—while the exercise of war powers is a function of 
Congress, implying participation by both the House and the Senate. G. Sidney Buchanan, A
Proposed Model for Determining the Validity of the Use of Force Against Foreign 
Adversaries Under the United States Constitution, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 379, 419-21 (1992). 
Alternatively, others argue that “[i]f by treaty the President and the Senate have an 
independent constitutional power to initiate military action without the approval of both 
houses of Congress, then the [provision is] unconstitutional [because] Congress by statute 
[cannot] destroy a power granted independently by the constitution to the President and the 
Senate.” Id.
Section 1547(a)(1)-2) is probably constitutional. In the hierarchy of United States domestic 
law, the constitution is the highest legal authority. U.S. CONST. art. VI (Supremacy Clause). 
Yet the Constitution does not specify the relationship between treaties and statutes. As a 
general rule, if there is a conflict between a treaty and a statute, the last one in time controls. 
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). Additionally, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held “that the constitutional delegation of the war-declaring power to the 
Congress . . . [imposes on it] a duty of mutual participation in the prosecution of war.” 
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971). “By definition, Congress cannot 
‘mutually participate’ in a use of force decision unless both of its houses are involved in that 
decision.” Buchanan, supra, at 420. Therefore, it appears constitutional to mandate that the 
President cannot rely on a previously signed treaty as authorization to commence military 
action and use force against another nation-state.  
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intended to constitute specific statutory authorization” under the War 
Powers Resolution.136
The last section describes the severability of the Resolution.137 If one 
provision of the statute is held invalid, such invalidity will not affect the 
other remaining provisions.138
III. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE WAS Unconstitutional AND VIOLATED THE 
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
A.  President Clinton Lacked the Constitutional Authority to Commit 
United States Armed Forces to Operation Allied Force 
On March 24, 1999, in a nationally televised address to the nation,
President Clinton argued that air-strikes by United States Armed Forces 
acting in coalition with NATO forces were necessary to protect innocent 
Albanians, to prevent the conflict from spreading to the rest of Europe, and 
to act with our European allies in maintaining peace.139 That same day, 
Operation Allied Force began bombing targets in Kosovo and Serbia 
proper.140
Over the next two months, President Clinton defended his unilateral 
decision to send United States Armed Forces to Kosovo to carry out air-
strikes. Two days after Operation Allied Force began, President Clinton sent 
identical letters to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, and to Strom Thurmond, President Pro Tempore of the 
Senate.141 The letter opened:  
At approximately 1:30 p.m. eastern standard time, on March 24, 1999, 
U.S. military forces, at my direction and in coalition with our NATO 
allies, began a series of air strikes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) in response to the FRY government’s continued campaign of 
violence and repression against the ethnic Albanian population in 
Kosovo.142
The letter goes on to detail the circumstances that led to the decision to 
begin air strikes in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the 
atrocities committed by the Milosevic government and the Milosevic 
 136. War Powers Resolution § 1547(a)(1)-(2). 
 137. Id. § 1548. 
 138. Id.
 139. Address to Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 1 PUB. PAPERS 451, 451 (Mar. 24, 1999). 
 140. Id.
 141. Clinton v. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37 (D.C.C. 1999). 
 142. Id. at 37-38 (quoting Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 19). 
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government’s history of noncompliance with resolutions of the United 
Nations Security Council and NATO.143 The letter concludes:  
“We cannot predict with certainty how long these operations will need to 
continue . . . . Milosevic must stop his offensive, stop the repression and 
agree to a peace accord based on the framework from Rambouillet. . . . I
have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to 
conduct foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief 
Executive. In doing so, I have taken into account the views and support 
expressed by the Congress . . . . I am providing this Report as part of my 
efforts to keep the Congress fully informed, consistent with the War 
Powers Resolution. I appreciate the support of the Congress in this 
action.”144
President Clinton was relying upon the independent authority of the 
President as the Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces 
under Article II of the United States Constitution as the legal basis for his 
unilateral decision to send American forces into hostilities in Kosovo. 
President Clinton made it clear from the beginning that he did not need 
congressional authorization.145 However, President Clinton was mistaken.  
It is necessary to classify the eleven-week, United States-led military 
campaign in Kosovo as either a war or something less in order to assess the 
constitutionality of President Clinton’s initiation of military action.146 “If a 
conflict is a . . . perfect war, then the Constitution requires that Congress 
authorize it through a formal declaration of war.”147 If a conflict is an 
imperfect war, then either a formal declaration of war or some other type of 
congressional authorization is required before the United States enters the 
conflict.148 “If a military conflict does not exist, but a dangerous situation 
does, then the President’s Commander in Chief power instills him with full 
authority to position United States troops.”149
The Constitution does not define war. Consequently, it is difficult to 
classify conflicts for constitutional purposes. Fortunately, the United States 
Supreme Court has provided some definitional clarity. In Bas v. Tingy the 
Court described perfect and imperfect war. 150 With regard to perfect war, 
the Court said: 
 143. Id. at 38 (citing Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 38). 
 144. Id. (citing Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 19) (emphasis added). 
 145. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets 
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 1 PUB. PAPERS 459 (Mar. 
26, 1999) [hereinafter Clinton’s Letter of Mar. 1999]. 
 146. Hahn, supra note 101, at 2359.  
 147. Id.; see also. See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 40 (1800) (opinion of Washington, J.); 
J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 33 (1991). 
 148. Id.; see also Bas, 4 U.S. at 40-41. 
 149. Id. at 2359-60; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  
 150. Bas, 4 U.S. at 40. 
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If it be declared in form, it is called solemn, and is of the perfect kind; 
because one whole nation is at war with another whole nation; and all the 
members of the nation declaring war, are authorized to commit hostilities 
against all the members of the other, in every place, and under every 
circumstance. In such a war all the members act under a general authority, 
and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.151
With respect to imperfect war, the Court said: 
[H]ostilities may subsist between two nations more confined in its nature 
and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and things; and this is more 
properly termed imperfect war; because not solemn, and because those 
who are authorized to commit hostilities, act under special authority, and 
can go no further than to the extent of their commission. Still, however, it 
is public war, because it is an external contention by force, between some 
of the members of two nations, authorized by the legitimate powers. It is a 
war between the two nations, though all members are not authorized to 
commit hostilities such as in solemn war, where the government restrains 
the general power.152
The Kosovo conflict was an imperfect war for reasons beyond the 
absence of a formal declaration of war.153 The Kosovo conflict was an 
imperfect war because not all members of the United States Armed Forces 
were “authorized to conduct hostilities”—United States ground forces were 
not engaged in the conflict.154
Furthermore, “[t]he ‘nature and extent’ of the Kosovo operation indicates 
that it was an imperfect war.”155 The operation attempted to achieve 
specific, limited political objectives.156 During the air campaign, United 
States and NATO leaders repeatedly declared that the goals of Operation 
Allied Force were to (1) cease all combat activities and killings; (2) ensure 
the withdrawal of Serb Military, police and paramilitary forces from 
Kosovo; (3) allow the deployment of an international military force; (4) 
allow the return of all refugees and the access of international humanitarian 
aid; and (5) “create a framework for establishing a political solution to 
Kosovo’s status based on the grounds set forth at Rambouillet.”157
Additionally, “the risks associated with the [Kosovo] conflict indicate 
that the United States fought an imperfect war.”158 “First, there was no risk 
that United States sovereignty might be lost or even that its power would 
 151. Id.
 152. Id.
 153. Hahn, supra note 101, at 2361. 
 154. Id. at 2362.  
 155. Id.
 156. Id.
 157. Id. See Roberts, supra note 86, at 2362 (citing Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
Address at the Chicago Economic Club (Apr. 22, 1999)). 
 158. Hahn, supra note 101, at 2363. 
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substantially decline from a loss in the war.159 Second, the risk to American 
forces was different from that in a perfect war.”160 NATO fought from the 
air because it was not willing to risk lives during Operation Allied Force.161
As a result, there was a much smaller chance of United States troops 
sustaining casualties.162 Finally, “NATO strategists lacked a clear 
conception of when victory was achieved—a state of affairs common to 
imperfect wars.”163
Since the conflict in Kosovo constituted an “imperfect war,” President 
Clinton could not act unilaterally—solely relying on the Commander in 
Chief power enumerated in the Constitution. Before introducing American 
troops into the Kosovo conflict, President Clinton needed congressional 
consent through either a formal declaration of war or statutory 
authorization.164 President Clinton also had to comply with the War Powers 
Resolution after introducing troops into hostilities. 
B. President Clinton Violated the War Powers Resolution 
President Clinton had to fulfill three requirements in order to comply 
with the War Powers Resolution. First, he had to consult with Congress 
before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities.165 Second, 
he had to present a written report on the situation within forty-eight hours to 
the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate166 and 
then provide periodic reports not less than every six months.167 Third, he 
had to remove the United States Armed Forces from the hostilities within 
sixty calendar days after submitting the initial report unless Congress had 
declared war or had enacted specific authorization for the use of United 




 161. Roberts, supra note 86, at 110. 
 162. Hahn, supra note 101, at 2363. 
 163. Id.
164. Id. at 2362. 
 165. War Powers Resolution § 1542. 
 166. Id. § 1543(a). 
 167. Id. § 1543(c). 
 168. Id. § 1544(b). 
 169. Howard, supra note 5, at 283-84.  
It is important to mention that no court has ever upheld a challenge to the War Powers 
Resolution. All challenges have been dismissed under limiting doctrines such as standing, 
ripeness, equitable discretion, and the political question doctrine. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d 
34 (D.C.C. 1999); see also Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ange v. 
Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990) (dismissing challenge to Gulf War on political 
question, equitable discretion, and ripeness grounds); Lowery v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 
(D.D.C. 1987) (dismissing challenge to reflagging operations in the Persian Gulf on 
equitable discretion and political question grounds); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. 
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President Clinton met the first requirement. There was ongoing 
consultation between President Clinton’s administration and Congress 
concerning the situation in Kosovo that was highlighted by significant 
testimony before congressional committees by the President’s cabinet 
members.170
President Clinton also met the second requirement. He submitted a report 
“consistent with the war Powers Resolution” within forty-eight hours to the 
Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate.171
Furthermore, he provided periodic reports to Congress. On April 7, 1999, 
President Clinton sent letters to Speaker Hastert and Senator Thurmond 
reporting on the situation in Kosovo as part of his “efforts to keep the 
Congress fully informed, consistent with the War Powers Resolution.”172
“The letter states that ‘[w]e will continue to intensify our actions to achieve 
the objectives I set forth in my report to the Congress of March 26 and to 
support the international relief efforts being conducted in the region.’”173
“The letter reemphasizes that it is ‘not possible to predict how long [the] 
operations will continue.’”174 On May 25, 1999, President Clinton again 
reported to Congress.175 He informed members of Congress that he deployed 
more aircraft and combat ground troops to the region to support deep strike 
operations.176
Yet President Clinton failed to meet the third requirement. Unless 
Congress had declared war or enacted specific legislation approving the use 
of United States Armed Forces, President Clinton had to terminate any use 
Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983) (dismissing challenge to covert assistance to Nicaragua contras on 
political question grounds); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982) (dismissing 
challenge to military aid to El Salvador on political question grounds).  
Consequently, those who seek remedies for Presidential violations of the War Powers 
Resolution will likely be left empty-handed. Apparently, those who feel the President has 
violated the War Powers Resolution, or the Constitution for that matter, are relegated to 
protest demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns to their Congressional representatives. 
 170. Howard, supra note 5, at 284; see also id. at 284 n.141 (“Situation in Kosovo: 
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Int’l Relations, 106th Cong. 4 (1999) . . . (statement of 
Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State, updating the committee on the impact of NATO 
operations on Yugoslavian President Milosevic); Supplemental Appropriations for Kosovo 
Operations, Refugee Relief, and Other Requirements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Defense of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 1999 WL 16946755 (1999) . . . (statement 
of William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, updating the committee on military operations 
and their effect in Kosovo”)).
 171. Clinton’s Letter of Mar. 1999, supra note 145. 
 172. Campbell , 52 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (quoting Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 38). 
 173. Id.
 174. Id.
 175. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 898 (May 
25, 1999).  
 176. Id.
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of the armed forces within sixty calendar days from submitting his initial 
report.177
Congress never declared war. After President Clinton issued an 
executive order designating the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a 
“combat zone,”178 the House of Representatives voted on four measures. By 
a vote of 427 to 2, the House rejected a joint resolution declaring a state of 
war between the United States and the government of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia.179
The House then rejected, by a tie vote, the concurrent resolution that had 
been passed by the Senate on March 23, 1999, authorizing the President to 
conduct military air operations and missile strikes against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.180
In an odd twist of events, the House also rejected a concurrent resolution 
that would have directed the President, “pursuant to section [1544(c)] of the 
War Powers Resolution, to remove United States Armed Forces from their 
positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.”181
Despite this inconsistent decision, one thing is clear: Congress did not 
declare war. Consequently, President Clinton needed congressional 
approval to introduce United States Armed Forces, as part of Operation 
Allied Force, into hostilities in Kosovo.  
Under the War Powers Resolution, “only express legislative support for 
combat operations may be regarded as constitutionally sufficient.”182 On 
May 20, 1999, Congress passed Pub. L. No. 106-31, an Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act that, inter alia, provided supplemental 
emergency appropriations in the amount of $11.8 billion for the conflict in 
Yugoslavia.183 The Appropriations Act required the President to transmit to 
Congress “a report, in both classified and unclassified form, on current 
United States participation in Operation Allied Force,” defined as 
“operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) during 
 177. See War Powers Resolution § 1544(b). 
 178. Exec. Order No. 13,119, 64 Fed. Reg. 18,797 (Apr. 13, 1999). 
 179. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34,38 (D.C.C. 1999) (citing H.R.J. Res. 44, 106th 
Cong. (1999)). 
 180. Id. (citing S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999)). 
 181. Id. (citing H.R. Con. Res. 82, 106th Cong. (1999)). “The House passed a bill that 
prohibit[ed] the use of Department of Defense funds for deployment of United States ground 
forces to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without specific congressional authorization.” 
Id. (quoting H.R. 1569, 106th Cong. (1999)). 
 182. Corn, supra note 58, at 1174.  
 183. John C. Yoo, UN War, US War Powers, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 357 (2000) 
(referring to the $11.8 billion funding request); see also, Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57 (1999); Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 38. 
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the period beginning on March 24, 1999, and ending on such date as NATO 
may designate, to resolve the conflict with respect to Kosovo.”184
Although Pub. L. No. 106-31 specifically appropriated over $5 billion to 
fund continuing hostilities in Kosovo, it did not make specific reference to 
the War Powers Resolution.185 Therefore, Congress never authorized the use 
of United States Armed Forces in Kosovo as part of Operation Allied Force 
under the War Powers Resolution.  
Since Congress neither declared war nor issued specific statutory 
authorization for the use of United States Armed Forces in Kosovo, 
President Clinton was required to remove the armed forces from hostilities 
within sixty days. He did not. Therefore, one can easily prove, through 
simple addition, that President Clinton violated the War Powers Resolution.  
President Clinton issued an Executive Order designating the Kosovo 
region a United States combat zone and March 24, 1999 as “the date of 
commencement of combat activities in such zone.”186 Bombing attacks 
against Serbian targets both in Kosovo and Serbia proper did not end until 
June 10, 1999—seventy-nine days after the war first began and nineteen 
days after the War Powers Resolution’s sixty-day clock had ended.187
In sum, President Clinton lacked the constitutional authority to 
unilaterally commit United States Armed Forces to Operation Allied Force 
and the Kosovo conflict. Even though Congress provided funding for the 
Kosovo conflict and the House of Representatives expressed its support for 
the American troops involved, those actions were not sufficient legislative 
authorization for military hostilities.188 Accordingly, President Clinton 
violated not only the War Powers Resolution because he failed to stop an air 
war that lasted nineteen days after the Resolution’s sixty-day clock had 
ended,189 but also the Constitution because he introduced United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities without congressional approval.  
IV.  OPERATION ALLIED FORCE CANNOT BE LEGALLY JUSTIFIED UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
There is little doubt that the intervention in Kosovo had, at its base, a 
concern for human rights. But, “there is no clear law permitting 
humanitarian intervention in cases short of genocide.”190 Humanitarian 
184. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 38 (citing Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, Pub.L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 57, 76-77 (1999)). 
 185. Id.
 186. Exec. Order No. 13,119, 64 Fed. Reg. 18797 (Apr. 13, 1999). 
 187. Address to the Nation on the Military Technical Agreement on Kosovo, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 913, 913 (June 10, 1999). 
 188. Yoo, supra note 88, at 1681-82. 
 189. Id. at 1674, 1687. 
 190. KATHARINA PICHLER COLEMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND PEACE 
ENFORCEMENT: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 200 (2007) (noting that Article 
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intervention is not an exception to the United Nations Charter’s prohibitions 
on the use of force.191 Under the Charter, cross-border military force may be 
used in self-defense192 or with the authorization of the Security Council of 
the United Nations.193 NATO military actions during Operation Allied Force 
do not meet either condition.194
The military actions in Kosovo do not fit within the traditional norm of 
self-defense.195 As a result, the intervention in Kosovo would be lawful only 
if authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations.196 However, 
NATO bypassed the UN Security Council and acted unilaterally.197
Therefore, since NATO’s military action in Kosovo was neither in self-
defense nor authorized by the UN Security Council, NATO’s use of force in 
Kosovo violated the UN Charter. If NATO’s use of force violated the UN 
Charter’s prohibition against the use of force, then it was illegal under 
customary international law.198
There exists dissention among jurists as to the justification of 
humanitarian intervention under customary international law. Kathrina 
8 of the 1951 International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide arguably enjoins international military action against genocide). 
 191. Jonathan I. Charney, Editorial Comments, NATO’s Kosovo Intervention: 
Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 834, 836 (1999). 
 192. U.N. Charter art. 51; see Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist 
Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 488 (2006).  
 193. U.N. Charter art. 42; see Posner, supra note 192, at 488. 
 194. Charney, supra note 191, at 834-35.  
 195. Paul W. Kahn, War Powers and the Millennium, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 11, 51 
(2000). Kahn also posits that “[t]he military action in Kosovo was not an enforcement 
action . . . [nor was it] a police action under Chapter Seven of the [UN] Charter.” Id. It is 
clear that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was not a response to an armed attack on any 
NATO member country and therefore cannot be justified as an act of collective self-defense. 
See COLEMAN, supra note 190, at 197. 
 196. See Posner, supra note 192, at 492. 
 197. Nanda, supra note 41, at 1. In the months before the NATO bombing in Kosovo, 
China and Russia appeared ready to veto any call for UN intervention, as well as any 
mandate that conferred upon NATO such a right. Falk, supra note 75, at 850. 
 198. Serbia challenged the legality under international law of the use of force by 
various NATO countries during the Kosovo conflict. Unfortunately, the ICJ never resolved 
the issue because the court unanimously decided that it had no jurisdiction to hear the cases. 
Legality of Use of Force (Serb. & Montenegro v. Belg.), 2004 I.C.J. 279 (Dec. 15), available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org.  
However, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded “that the NATO 
military intervention was illegal but legitimate.” INDEP. INT’L COMM’N ON KOSOVO, THE 
KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 1, 4 (2000),
available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256
989005CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf [hereinafter Kosovo Report]. The Commission applied 
three threshold principles and eight contextual principles to NATO’s military intervention in 
order to evaluate its humanitarian legitimacy. Id. at 193-94. The Commission reasoned that 
NATO’s military action “was illegal because it did not receive prior approval from the 
United Nations Security Council . . . [but] justified because all diplomatic avenues had been 
exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of 
Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.” Id. at 4. 
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Pichler-Coleman citing Mary-Ellen O’Connell notes, “[T]here is no real 
evidence of a practice followed out of legal obligation to support a right of 
humanitarian intervention under customary international law.”199 However, 
Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne finds that jurists have noted through state practice, 
mainly in Eastern Europe, that a particular State’s violation of the norms of 
international law in regard to war and humanity against its own subjects or a 
particular subgroup of subjects could not be ignored, for it not only was to 
the detriment of those subjects but against all civilized States.200 Fonteyne 
contended that jurists feared inaction would be seen as justification of those 
violations and concluded that humanitarian intervention is legally 
permissible under customary international law.201
In recognition of this division among jurists, the following five criteria 
will be employed to evaluate the legitimacy under customary international 
law of the unilateral humanitarian intervention taken in Kosovo by NATO 
forces during Operation Allied Force: (1) necessity, (2) proportionality, (3) 
purpose, (4) nature of the actors, and (5) maximization of the best 
outcomes.202 If a majority of the criteria are met, then arguably NATO’s 
bombing of Kosovo was legally justified under the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention.203
 199. COLEMAN, supra note 190, at 200 (citing Mary Ellen O’Connell, The UN, NATO, 
and International Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57, 70 (2000)). 
 200. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of 
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 203, 214-32 (1974). Fonteyne supported his argument by looking as far back as the 
Crusades and including State practice via Russian intervention in Greece in 1827, “invoking, 
for the first time in history, humanitarian concern as justification for intervention,” id. at
207-08; France intervention in Syria in 1860 following massacre of thousands of Christians 
by local Moslem population, id. at 208-09; Serbian and Russian intervention in Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and Bulgaria in support of oppressed Christian populations in those areas, id. at 
211-12; Bulgarian, Greece and Serbian intervention against Turkish control programs in 
Macedonia, id. at 213.  
 201. Id. at 269 (“As long as the world community appears to be unable or unwilling to 
promptly respond in a collective manner to those dramatic situations where the very nature 
and existence of man are threatened, individual initiatives by concerned States will have to 
be relied upon if a viable world order is to be maintained.”). 
 202. These criteria were developed by Ved P. Nanda over two separate, yet related, 
articles. Ved P. Nanda, Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Haiti—
Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law, 20 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 305 (1992) [hereinafter Nanda Part I]; Ved P. Nanda et al., Tragedies in 
Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia—Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian 
Intervention Under International Law, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 827 (1998) [hereinafter 
Nanda Part II]. See also Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 258-67 (employing a three prong 
analysis of the substantive, procedural and preferential criteria of humanitarian intervention 
under customary international law). 
 203. Part IV of this paper does not explore whether NATO’s military action was 
morally justified. Rather, it explores the legality under international law of NATO’s use of 
force during Operation Allied Force. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
concluded that Operation Allied Force was morally justified because it was a humanitarian 
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The necessity criterion assesses “whether there was genocide or gross, 
persistent, and systematic violations of basic human rights.”204 If there was, 
then arguably the intervention was necessary. The necessity criterion can be 
detailed as including two, and depending upon the jurist possibly three, 
elements: the fundamental character of the human rights violations, the 
exceptionally large scale of those violations, and possibly the potential 
immediacy of those violations.205
It is indisputable that the Albanian Kosovars had suffered deprivation of 
human rights and widespread repression under the Milosevic regime.206
Thus, the fundamental character of the human rights involved is satisfied 
under the first element of the necessity criterion. The human rights 
discussed include, but are not limited to, the right to life and the prevention 
of torture.207
However, there exists debate upon the scale and thus the immediate 
threat of human rights violations. “The extent of the human rights violations 
in Kosovo prior to the withdrawal of the [Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe’s (OSCE)] observer force was not massive and 
widespread.”208 “In fact, the Security Council had authorized the 
deployment of the verification mission, which had effectively prevented the 
commission of widespread atrocities.”209 The Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s behavior toward the Albanian Kosovars “changed only after 
NATO forced the withdrawal of the OSCE observers.”210
This is clear from the indictment of Milosevic by the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.211 The specific 
charges against Milosevic document only one incident involving a 
significant number of deaths caused by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
forces in the months prior to the start of the NATO bombing campaign.212
That incident, in which forty-five civilians were killed, took place at Racak 
on January 15, 1999, more than two months before Operation Allied 
Force.213 All the remaining counts concern incidents that occurred after the 
intervention that had at its base human rights concerns. See generally, Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, Kosovo Report, supra note 198. 
 204. Nanda Part II, supra note 202, at 827.  
 205. Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 258-60. 
 206. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. See generally LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE,
YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION (1997). 
 207. Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 258-59. 
 208. Charney, supra note 191, at 839.  
 209. Id. at 839-40 (emphasis added). 
 210. Id. at 840. 
 211. Id.; see Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia May 22, 1999) [hereinafter Milosevic Indictment]. 
 212. Charney, supra note 191, at 840; Milosevic Indictment, supra note 211, at pp 7-
10 ¶¶ 28, 36-37, 39, and at pp 21-28 ¶¶ 97-98. 
 213. Charney, supra note 191, at 840; Milosevic Indictment, supra note 211, at 26 ¶ 
96a. 
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bombing commenced; therefore, those incidents cannot be used to justify 
Operation Allied Force.214
There were also reports of incidents involving the displacement of 
Albanian Kosovars within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.215 German 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer claimed the refugee crisis was produced 
by a Serbian ethnic cleansing plan codenamed “Operation Horseshoe.”216
“NATO’s leaders . . . . used the existence of the plan to illustrate 
Milosevic’s character, and to prove that the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo was 
not triggered by the NATO bombing, thereby justifying the NATO 
campaign.”217
However, a retired German brigadier-general questioned the legitimacy 
of Operation Horseshoe and alleged that the German Defense Ministry 
turned a vague report from Bulgarian intelligence into a “plan.”218 The 
brigadier-general contended that German politicians misquoted the 
Bulgarian report, which noted the Serbian military goal was focused on 
destroying the Kosovo Liberation Army rather than the expulsion of the 
entire Kosovo Albanian population.219 German reporter Franz Josef Hutsch 
“got the impression in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 that ‘a lot of things were 
staged’ or ‘orchestrated’ and that the Kosovo Liberation Army had very 
good ‘PR advisers.’”220 There rests, then, an issue as to whether NATO 
conducted its due diligence prior to the commencement of Operation Allied 
Force.221
A postwar statistical analysis of the patterns of displacement, conducted 
by Patrick Ball of the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, found a direct correlation between Serbian security force 
operations and refugee outflows, with NATO operations having little effect 
on the displacements.222
 214. Charney, supra note 191, at 840 (emphasis added); Milosevic Indictment, supra
note 211, at pp 21-28 ¶¶ 97-98. 
 215. Charney, supra note 191, at 840; Milosevic Indictment, supra note 211, at 10 ¶ 
39. 
 216. SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FOURTH REPORT, KOSOVO: THE 
MILITARY CAMPAIGN, 1999-2000, H.C. 28-II, ¶ 93 (U.K.) (citing 345 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th 
ser.) (2000) 686W (U.K.)). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. (citing THE TIMES, Apr. 2000). 
 220. Testimony About the War That was “Staged” in Kosovo, SENSE NEWS AGENCY
(Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.sense-agency.com/icty/testimony-about-the-war-that-was-
staged-in-kosovo.29.html?cat_id=1&news_id=8781.
 221. Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 260 (“[A] good faith determination by the 
prospective intervenor that human rights violations are in fact imminently threatening.”). It is 
illogical to have to wait until an actual violation occurs; therefore, reasonableness must be 
applied.  
 222. ABA Cent. & E. Eur. Law Initiative & Am. Ass’n for Advancement of Sci., 
Political Killings in Kosova/Kosovo, MAR.-JUNE 1999, at 11 (2000), available at 
http://shr.aaas.org/kosovo/pk/politicalkillings.pdf. 
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By comparing the estimated numbers of people who left each municipality 
over time to the times when NATO airstrikes occurred, the AAAS study 
concludes that only a small fraction of Kosovar Albanians fled 
Kosova/Kosovo as a direct result of NATO bombing raids. It also 
concludes that the mass exodus of refugees from Kosova/Kosovo occurred 
in patterns so regular that they must have been coordinated. In the context 
of descriptive accounts given by refugees, the most likely explanation for 
the migration is the implementation of a centrally-organized campaign to 
clear at least certain regions of ethnic Albanians.223
NATO relied upon the impression that Operation Horseshoe would go 
into effect in Kosovo in an attempt to bolster the scale and immediacy of the 
human rights violations. Yet there existed questionable evidence of 
Operation Horseshoe and its goals and a lack of large scale violations prior 
to NATO operations. Because there were not widespread incidents of gross, 
persistent, and systematic violations of basic human rights in Kosovo before 
NATO’s bombing campaign began,224 Operation Allied Force may not be 
justified as necessary.225
In correlation with the necessity criterion there exists what Fonteyne 
describes as the “procedural”226 criteria or what can be domestically termed 
as exhaustion of all administrative remedies. These procedural elements 
include the exhaustion of all peaceful means of settlement227 and the 
absence of any reasonable prospect of timely action by international 
organizations.228
Even though the Albanian Kosovars’ suffering could not have been 
addressed effectively by the UN Security Council because of the probable 
veto of any resolution by Russia or China, the NATO intervention was still 
unnecessary.229 One must still ask hard questions such as, were all 
diplomatic efforts and non-forcible remedies exhausted before Operation 
Allied Force began?  
Certainly not all diplomatic efforts were exhausted. In fact, there were 
questionable efforts made to negotiate with the Federal Republic of 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. In fact, on the 10-year anniversary of NATO’s bombing, Serbia’s Prime 
Minister Mirko Cvetkovic said NATO air strikes on Kosovo “resulted in ethnic cleansing 
and gross violations of human rights . . . .” NATO Strikes Over Kosovo Continue to Divide, 
10 Years On, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,4121076,00.html (emphasis added). 
 225. If the authors apply Fonteyne’s immediacy element to the equation, NATO’s 
intervention may have been considered necessary if NATO did in fact reasonably believe 
Operation Horseshoe was in effect. This appears to be an element not required in Nanda’s 
categorical approach to humanitarian intervention. 
 226. Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 264-66. 
 227. Id. at 264. 
 228. Id. at 264-65. 
 229. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
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Yugoslavia.230 “The Rambouillet accords were tilted against the Serbs, who 
were provided no opportunity to negotiate revisions to the draft 
agreement.”231 Similarly, in meetings that NATO and U.S. officials held 
with Milosevic, they pitched take-it-or-leave-it propositions.232 Moreover, 
using non-forcible remedies, such as an oil embargo or other economic 
sanctions, was considered only after the bombing campaign began.233
Clearly, there was more that could have been done before resorting to the 
use of force. Therefore, under a procedural analysis, Operation Allied Force 
was unnecessary.  
The proportionality criterion examines “the duration and propriety of the 
force applied.”234 The elements of proportionality include no unnecessary 
force,235 no unnecessary affectation of the authority structures of the States 
intervened,236 and no unnecessary duration.237
Operation Allied Force was the largest allied military operation in 
Europe since World War II and lasted seventy-nine days.238 During the 
Operation, allied pilots flew over 14,006 strike missions239 from a safe 
altitude of 20,000 feet.240 The means of attack included “B-52s, cluster 
bombs, and depleted uranium ordnance”—a weapon of questionable 
lawfulness.241 NATO intended to continue the air campaign on an 
“intensifying scale” until Milosevic “‘submitted’ without conditions.”242
 230. Charney, supra note 191, at 840. 
 231. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 232. Id.
 233. Charney, supra note 191, at 840. 
 234. Nanda Part II, supra note 202, at 827. 
 235. Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 262. (“[E]mploy only the amount of troops 
reasonably necessary to accomplish the objective, so as to reduce to a minimum infringement 
upon the territorial integrity and political independence of the State intervened.”) (citing 
Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 349-
50 (1967)). 
 236. Id. at 262-63. Seek “to limit the lawfulness of extensive alteration by the 
intervenor of the internal authority structures of that State.” Id. (citing John Norton Moore, 
The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 9 VA. J. INT’L L. 205, 264 (1969), 
“If the protection of human rights requires the overthrow of authority structures, it would 
seem best to require U.N. authorization as a prerequisite for action. To allow unilateral action 
in such cases would be to permit all manner of self-serving claims for the overthrow of 
authority structures.” T. Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light 
of Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 47 (citing John Norton Moore, 
The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 9 VA. J. INT’L L. 205, 264 (1969)). 
 237. Id. at 263-64. The removal of troops upon completion of objective. 
 238. Nanda, supra note 41, at 9; Roberts, supra note 86, at 109.  
 239. Roberts, supra note 86, at 109.  
 240. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 241. Falk, supra note 75, at 851. 
 242. Id. at 855. 
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The bombing caused severe damage to Serbia’s infrastructure and 
destroyed many cities and towns.243 The bombing targeted key components 
of the civilian infrastructure and resulted in heavy damage to the water 
supply and electricity systems.244 Furthermore, the bombing “caused severe 
pollution through the destruction of chemical factories and oil refineries.”245
The bombing caused the deaths of hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians246
and induced a flow of refugees that approached one million.247 Finally, 
NATO miscalculated that Milosevic would capitulate after a few days of 
bombing.248 This miscalculation caused NATO to intensify its efforts, which 
ultimately led to a disproportionate use of force by NATO.249
“The magnitude and effects of [the] bombing are difficult to reconcile 
with the humanitarian claims made by NATO.”250 This difficulty is 
compounded by NATO’s reliance on tactics of warfare that minimized the 
risk of harm to its forces, while shifting that risk to the civilians of 
Kosovo.251 The absence of casualties among NATO forces and the killing of 
innocent Kosovars seriously damages NATO’s humanitarian rationale for 
Operation Allied Force.252 Although the duration of the bombing may have 
been relatively short, the impropriety of NATO’s force in terms of 
magnitude and effect supports the view that NATO’s force was 
disproportional.  
The purpose criterion explores “whether the intervention was motivated 
by humanitarian considerations, self interest, or mixed motivations.”253 The 
 243. Id. at 851; Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. In the years that followed Operation 
Allied Force there grew rising concern from some in the international community of not only 
the Operation itself, but also the derivative effects of the overall campaign; see Press 
Release, Office of the Prosecutor for the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo., 
Prosecutor’s Report on the NATO Bombing Campaign, U.N. Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-e (June 13, 
2000), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/7846; see also Marjorie Cohn, No “Victor’s 
Justice” in Yugoslavia: NATO Must be Held Accountable for Its War Crimes, Jurist (Mar. 
27, 2000), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew4.HTM (discussing how U.N. High 
Commissioner Mary Robinson had warned NATO it might be held accountable for war 
crimes after two buses in Kosovo were bombed killing more than fifty citizens); see also
Roberts, supra note 86, at 123 (citing Commissioner Robinson, “In the NATO bombing of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, large numbers of civilians have incontestably been 
killed.”); see also INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FINAL REPORT TO THE 
PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN 
AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA(June 2000), reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1257, 
1282 (2000) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN].  
 244. Falk, supra note 75, at 851.  
 245. Id.
 246. Id.; Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 247. Falk, supra note 75, at 851-52. 
 248. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 249. Id.
 250. Falk, supra note 75, at 855-56. 
 251. Id. at 856. 
 252. Id.
 253. Nanda Part II, supra note 202, at 827. 
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NATO initiative was not a war in the conventional sense. Rather, it was 
based on a claim of humanitarian intervention. NATO’s Secretary-General 
stated the objectives of the air-strikes were “[t]o prevent more human 
suffering, more repression, more violence against the civilian population of 
Kosovo . . . . “254 Similarly, President Clinton justified the NATO action in 
the following words:  
Today we and our 18 NATO allies agreed to do what we said we would 
do, what we must do, to restore the peace. Our mission is clear: to 
demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose so that the Serbian 
leaders understand the imperative of reversing course; to deter an even 
bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo; and, if necessary, 
to seriously damage Serbian military’s capacity to harm the people of 
Kosovo. In short, if President Milosevic will not make peace, we will limit 
his ability to make war.255
Notwithstanding these statements, there is evidence that other 
considerations were involved. Six days before Operation Allied Force, 
Walter Slocombe, United States Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
stated that “[t]he conflict in Kosovo threatens our calculated, cold-blooded 
national interests . . . .”256 Essentially, the conflict in Kosovo implicated 
national security concerns of the United States.257 In addition, Operation 
Allied Force was not tailored to protect ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, but 
rather had the broader objective of undermining the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia’s government in order to force its acceptance of the Rambouillet 
peace agreement.258 Despite the possible mixed-motives of the United 
States, it is fair to say that Operation Allied Force was a humanitarian 
intervention by NATO acting under the leadership of the United States. At 
bottom, Operation Allied Force’s purpose was grounded in humanitarian 
concerns.259
 254. Nanda, supra note 41, at 8 (citing Javier Solana, Statement by NATO Secretary-
General on Air Strikes, Mar. 23, 1999,  
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/solanatranscript.html). 
 255. Id. (citing CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; In the President’s Words: ‘We Act to 
Prevent a Wider War, ‘N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A15, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/25/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-in-the-president-s-words-
we-act-to-prevent-a-wider-war.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm). 
 256. Howard, supra note 5, at 266 n.23 (citing Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense 
Authorization Act-United States Policy in the Balkans: Hearings on Authorization and 
Oversight Before the House Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. 722 (1999)). 
 257. Howard, supra note 5, at 266.  
 258. See Charney, supra note 191, at 840. 
 259. See, Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 261 (“[It is] ‘naive’ . . . to require that ‘where 
the decision to intervene falls to a single state, it should be safeguarded by a requirement that 
the state be totally disinterested.’ The presence, among the . . . intervenor, of some 
considerations of national interest should not be taken to necessarily ‘invalidate the resort to 
[force] if the overriding motive is the protection of human rights.’”) (citing Richard B. 
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The nature of the actors’ criterion appraises whether the humanitarian 
intervention was “collective or unilateral.”260 It is clear that NATO’s 
humanitarian intervention was unilateral. NATO acted unilaterally because 
it lacked a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. Furthermore, 
although NATO is a collective, regional organization, the countries 
comprising NATO are a small part of the total number of United Nations 
members. Since only NATO members planned and implemented Operation 
Allied Force, they acted unilaterally from the United Nations as a whole.  
Lastly, the maximization of best outcomes criterion assesses “whether 
the intervention maximized the best outcome.”261 Operation Allied Force 
failed to optimize the best outcome.262 Operation Allied Force’s purpose 
was to protect Kosovar Albanians from the excessive use of force by 
Serbs.263 However, the operation resulted in Milosevic intensifying his 
efforts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo.264 As a result, almost a million ethnic 
Albanians either were displaced within Kosovo or fled to neighboring 
countries.265
A year after Operation Allied Force ended, Kosovo was still beset with 
ethnic hatred, violence, crime, and revenge killings.266 The UN Secretary-
General’s June 6, 2000 report on the United Nations Interim Mission in 
Kosovo is revealing.267 The report notes that “Some aspects of Kosovo 
society have not changed. Kosovo Serbs and other minority communities 
continue to be murdered, attacked and threatened. [United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo] staff members have also been murdered 
by extremists motivated by ethnic hatred.”268
Furthermore, the report states:   
Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 350 (1967 )). 
See Id. citing Lillich, supra note 235, at 350 “naïve to require that where the decision to 
intervene falls to a single state, it should be safeguarded by a requirement that the state be 
totally disinterested. The presence among the intervenor of some considerations of national 
interest should not be taken to necessarily invalidate the resort to force if the overriding 
motive is the protection of human rights.” 
 260. Nanda Part II, supra note 202, at 827; see also Fonteyne, supra note 200, at 266-
67 (stating that “collective operations should be preferred over individual measures. While it 
is true that ‘intervention does not gain in legality . . . by being collective rather than 
individual,’ there is nevertheless a presumption that collective action is more likely to ensure 
the relative purity of the intentions required from the intervenors.”) (citation omitted). 
 261. Nanda Part II, supra note 202, at 827-28.  
 262. Nanda, supra note 41, at 18. 
 263. Id.
 264. Id. at 18-19. 
 265. Id. at 19. 
 266. Id.
 267. Id. at 15. 
 268. Nanda, supra note 41, at 15. See also U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, ¶ 22, 
U.N. Doc. S/2000/538 (June 6, 2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/sgrep00.htm [hereinafter Report of Security-
General]. 
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As a result of the continued violence and harassment, the freedom of 
movement of minority communities remains restricted. This in turn affects 
their ability to fully exercise a range of basic rights, such as health care, 
education, social welfare, access to public utilities and other public 
services. [Furthermore, [d]iscrimination in the employment sector, 
particularly against ethnic minorities . . . is increasingly apparent.269
In addition, there is strong evidence that the only real winners in Kosovo 
were the members of the Albanian mafia engaged in organized crime.270
As time progressed, numerous talks amongst the parties between 2003 
and 2007 yielded few results as protests and rallies often interrupted into 
violence.271 The freedom of movement of minority communities still 
remained restricted.272 Ethnic violence still plagued Kosovo as the ethnic 
Albanian majority continued to push for independence from Serbia.273 The 
end result of the violence and breakdown of negotiations was the unilateral 
declaration of independence issued by Kosovo’s elected parliament in 
February 2008. 
The parliamentary declaration quickly aroused international reaction on 
both ends of the spectrum as nations sought to recognize or declare invalid 
the Kosovo independence.274 On October 8, 2008, the UN General 
Assembly adopted resolution 63/3 (A/63/L.2) in which it requested the ICJ 
to render an Advisory Opinion on the following question: “Is the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
 269. Report of Security-General, supra note 268, at ¶¶ 41, 51. 
 270. See generally Frank Cilluffo & George Salmoiraghi, And the Winner Is . . . the 
Albanian Mafia, 22 WASH. Q. 21 (1999); see also Nanda, supra note 41, at 19. 
 271. From Racak to the ICJ Ruling: Kosovo Timeline Since 1999,
BALKANINSIGHT.COM (last visited Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://old.balkaninsight.com/en/main/info/29604/); Key Dates in Kosovo’s Drive for 
Independence, ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23292262/ 
(2008). Instances of violence include March 2004 riots across Kosovo, after three ethnic 
Albanian children drown in the Ibar River, alleged involvement of Serbs leads to nineteen 
deaths, and the February 2007 nationalist movement, Vetevendosje, protests lead to two 
deaths. 
 272. Grenade Explodes in Serb Classroom in Kosovo, REUTERS, Nov. 21, 2006, 
available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2006/11/21/us-kosovo-school-grenade-
idUKL2179137820061121. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Kosovo MPs Proclaim Independence, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249034.stm (reporting that demonstrators, numbering 
around 1000, threw stones and broke the windows of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade along 
with attacking a nearby McDonald’s restaurant. Russia, in particular, questioned the validity 
of the declaration under both international law and UN Security Council resolution 1244,
(1999). Journalists believe the Russian stance was based upon its own issues with the 
Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
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Government of Kosovo in accordance with International Law.”275 In other 
words, the ICJ was asked to render an opinion on whether the declaration of 
independence violated general international law and/or Security Council 
resolution 1244(1999).  
When discussing any violation of general principles of international law, 
the ICJ divested the issue of a unilateral declaration of independence from 
that of territorial integrity.276 The Advisory Opinion goes on to note, 
“several participants have invoked resolutions of the Security Council 
condemning particular declarations of independence.”277 The ICJ found no 
applicable prohibition in general international law against Kosovo’s 
unilateral declaration of independence.278
The Court then looked to any violation of the lex specialis created by 
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).279 The resolution sought to provide 
an interim administration for Kosovo, which would provide a transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions.280 Since the authors of 
the declaration were elected officials acting in their capacity as 
 275. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 4-5 (July 22) [hereinafter 
Accordance]. 
 276. Id. at 30-31. The Court notes Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United 
Nations which holds: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Id. The ICJ 
determined that Article 2 paragraph 4 concerns the relations between States, the Court found 
a unilateral declaration by a particular population of a State to be outside the principal of 
territorial integrity. The 2010 ICJ Advisory Opinion seems to brush past Operation Allied 
Force. In the forty-four page opinion there is not a single mention of the operation itself. The 
conclusion by the ICJ that this issue did not involve territorial integrity can be considered a 
correct determination if Operation Allied Force is ignored.  
 277. Id. at 30. Those resolutions include declarations by Southern Rhodesia, Northern 
Cyprus and the Republika Srpska. The ICJ found, however, that in all of those instances the 
Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the 
time that those declarations of independence were made; “the illegality attached to the 
declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these 
declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with 
the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international 
law… in the context of Kosovo, the Security Council has never taken this position.” Id. at 
30-31. 
 278. Id. at 32. 
 279. Accordance, supra note 275, at 32-33. In adopting resolution 1244 (1999), after 
the completion of Operation Allied Force, the Security Council was determined to resolve 
the grave humanitarian situation in the region and to put to an end the armed conflict in 
Kosovo. 
 280. Id. at 22. The Court found that the resolution contained three main aspects, (1) 
establishing an international civil and security presence in Kosovo with full civil and 
political authority, (2) the implementation of an interim international territorial 
administration for humanitarian purposes and (3) establishing an interim regime, not a 
permanent institutional framework. 
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representatives of the people of Kosovo and not members of the 
international interim regime, the Court found no violation.281
Operation Allied Force precipitated the current situation in Kosovo. 
Arguably, the only success one can speak of is the end of Serb violations 
against Albanian Kosovars initiated after the bombing began and the de 
facto partition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.282 Thus, it is fair to 
say that Operation Allied Force set into motion a series of events that 
resulted in the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo as opposed 
to joint proceedings between Kosovo and Serbia.  
The nature of Operation Allied Force, its legality issues, the resulting 
turmoil in the region and overall dismissal of any NATO violations only 
served to widen the divide between the parties as the years moved forward 
and thus ran counter to the maximization of the best outcome, which in the 
opinion of the authors would have been joint proceedings between the 
parties. 
In summation, because Operation Allied Force was unnecessary, 
disproportional, and failed to maximize the best outcome, it cannot be 
legally justified under customary international law as a humanitarian 
intervention. 
CONCLUSION
Operation Allied Force was “the most aggressive and sustained use of 
military force during the Clinton presidency.”283 However, President Clinton 
lacked the constitutional authority to authorize United States Armed Forces 
to participate in Operation Allied Force. Furthermore, President Clinton 
violated the War Powers Resolution by allowing United States Armed 
Forces to participate in Operation Allied Force beyond sixty days without 
express statutory authorization from Congress.284 Finally, NATO sought to 
justify Operation Allied Force as a humanitarian intervention. However, 
Operation Allied Force cannot be legally justified as a humanitarian 
intervention. Operation Allied Force was unnecessary. It failed to meet its 
purpose and to maximize the best outcome and the force used during the 
Operation was disproportionate. Thus, Operation Allied Force cannot be 
justified as a humanitarian intervention under general principles of 
customary international law—which means there is even less of an 
argument that President Clinton had the power to commit United States 
Armed Forces without congressional approval.285
 281. Id. at 22, 28. The ICJ determined that the declaration of independence would 
have been invalid if it had come out of the interim regime.
 282. This can also been seen as a failure to satisfy Fonteyne’s criteria and Moore’s 
contention that the invention not interfere with the authority structures of the State. 
 283. HENDRICKSON, supra note 81, at 117. 
 284. Corn, supra note 58, at 1154.  
 285. Kahn, supra note 195, at 52. 
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